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THE RIGHT AND DUTY OF CONGRESS TO 
RECOGNIZE WAR IN CUBA. 



SPEECH 



OF 



HON. JOHN W. DANIEL, 



OF VIRGINIA, 



SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 



Monday, May 17, 1897. 



"W A SHINGTON. 
1897. 

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SPEECH 

OF 

HON. JOHN W. DANIEL 



The Senate having under consideration the joint resolution (S. R. 26) declar- 
ing that a condition of public war exists in Cuba and that strict neutrality 
shall be maintained — 

Mr. DANIEL said: 

Mr. President: The distinguished Senator from Maryland 
[Mr. Wellington] seems to have taken a shot at creation on 
the motion to refer the pending resolution. This joint resolu- 
tion introduced by the Senator from Alabama [Mr. Morgan] 
recognizes a state of public war in Cuba, and upon that resolution 
he has discussed tariff, currency, and the late and the prospective 
Administrations of our Government in various ramifications ; but 
in so far as he has spoken to the matter in hand, the points which 
he makes seem to be in but a small compass. 

It seems to me, Mr. President, that the remarks of the Senator 
are based upon an entire misapprehension of the character of the 
joint resolution, and upon an entire misconception of the feeling 
which actuates Senators who will give their support to it. In the 
first place, the joint resolution does not in the least involve an 
act of hostility to Spain. There is no writer upon international 
law with whom I have any familiarity, and there is no publicist 
of accepted reputation as an authority upon such subjects, who 
contends that it is not within the competence of any nation to 
recognize a state of public war in another without giving any 
ground of offense to the nation against which that public war 
exists on the part of a revolutionary body. 

It is a curious incident of the civil war in this country which 
took place some thirty years ago that the President of the United 
States, Abraham Lincoln, was the first to recognize a state of pub- 
lic war, and it was held by the Supreme Court of the United Spates 
in the Prize Cases, reported in 2 Black, that the recognition made 
by him by a proclamation of blockade was in the line of humanity. 

The next point which the Senator makes is an appeal to our 
sympathy with Spain, and he says we should not recognize a state 
of public war against Spain, whatever may be the fact as to its 
existence, because Columbus discovered America. [Laughter.] 
It is a great pity that Columbus ever did discover America if the 
inhabitants of the new continent are to bring to America the 
savagery that prevailed here before they came. If we can not 
have Christian civilization in America, and if we are bound to 
look with cold indifference upon acts which would shock even a 
savage breast, some might consider it a pity that the ships which 
brought the newcomers to our shores were not lost upon the 
ocean and had ever populated the new-found clime. 

2783 3 



HUMANITY A RECOGNIZED GROUND FOR INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION. 

For my part, Mr. President, I shall address myself to-day for 
the most part to a very narrow feature of the debate. There are 
a number of Senators in this Chamber who sympathize with the 
joint resolution and who believe there is a state of public war in 
Cuba, and indeed the late President of the United States, whose 
policy in this regard is so much admired by the Senator from 
Maryland, in his message to the Congress of the United States, 
seemed to evince consciousness of a state of public war in Cuba, 
though he did not make any formal recognition thereof. 

However, he did hold out to Congress, in his message, a picture 
of the condition of affairs in Cuba, and did use language which it 
seems to me is eminently appropriate and applicable to the case, 
whatever may be the time which the Congress of the United States 
may select to apply the doctrines and principles which he asserts. 
I have deemed it not amiss- 
He says in his message of last December — 

to remind the Congress that a time may arrive when a correct policy and 
care for our interests, as well as a regard for the interests of other nations 
and their citizens, joined by considerations of humanity and a desire to see 
a rich and fertile country, intimately related to us, saved from complete 
devastation, will constrain our Government to such action as will subserve 
the interests thus involved and at the same time promise to Cuba and its in- 
habitants an opportunity to enjoy the blessings of peace. 

And the injunctions of neutrality that emanated from the Ad- 
ministration carried equally strong suggestions of existent pub- 
lic war in Cuba. 

So, Mr. President, while the late Administration by no means 
distinguished itself in the exhibition of any peculiar sympathy 
with the people of the neighboring Island of Cuba, who are only 
struggling to be free, it did recognize the fact that, according to 
principles of international law and under the duty which we owe 
to a neighboring country with which we are intimately related, a 
continuance of the condition of affairs which has harrowed the very 
soul of this nation might bring a time to pass when we should do 
something. 

The Administration did not undertake to say what that thing 
was; it only spoke of it in general terms; but it indicated the prin- 
ciple that humanity to a neighboring country with which we are 
intimately associated was a good ground for such action as the 
United States Government might see fit in its pleasure to take to 
intervene in the affairs of Spain and the insurgent Cubans. 

THE PENDING RESOLUTION DOES NOT INVOLVE INTERVENTION. 

Mr. President, the pending resolution, however, is not a proposi- 
tion of intervention. No international-law writer and no publicist 
of repute is of opinion that the mere recognition of a state of war 
in a neighboring nation or in any nation is an intervention in favor 
of one side or the other; and, where the recognition of belligerency 
is made, it is generally based upon the doctrine that it is a humane 
observance by the nation which makes the recognition, and that 
all of its influence is toward philanthropy and the cultivation of 
civilized usages in the conduct of war. 

THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO ACT BY ORDER OF JOINT RESOLUTION. 

Mr. President, there is no doubt in my mind that Congress has 
the power, by joint resolution or by any act passed in pursuance 
of any of its legitimate powers, to recognize eitlier the belligerency 

2783 



or the independence of a new state. For instance: To Congress 
is confided by the Constitution the sole power to regulate com- 
merce among the States and with foreign nations. If Congress 
to-morrow were to pass an act for the regulation of commerce, 
and were in that act so to regulate commerce as to recognize in 
the bod} 7 of the act either the belligerency or the independence of 
the new Cuban state, there is no one, as I conceive, who could 
deny the legitimacy of its action. 

So it seems to me that Congress may, by order or joint resolu- 
tion, subject to the approval of the President and subject also to 
its passage by Congress without the approval of the President, 
accomplish any purpose which it might accomplish by a direct act 
dealing with any portion of the subject-matter. 

I will read the provision of the Constitution, which is to be 
found in Article I, section 7: 

Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate 
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of 
adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and 
before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disap- 
proved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of 
Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case 
of a bill. 

Any subject-matter which is the proper subject-matter of an 
act of Congress may be also a proper subject-matter of an order, 
resolution, or vote, and we may very often accomplish in a short- 
hand way, by a resolution, order, or vote, that which if put in 
the form of a bill would require prolix details to effect. 

The recognition either of the belligerency or the independence 
of a new state is in effect a regulation of commerce, for there goes, 
as a necessary corollary to the proposition that a certain state is in 
a condition of belligerency or in the consummation of independ- 
ence, those rules of international law which apply to a state in 
that status; and the very declaration of belligerency or independ- 
ence on the part of the Congress of the United States, with the 
approval of the President, or if passed over his veto by the neces- 
sary vote, wo aid be an immediate regulation in certain respects 
of commercial relations with the countries affected by it. 

VARIOUS CONTENTIONS AS TO EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL POWERS. 

But, Mr. President, I wish now to examine the views which 
have been presented by certain Senators as to the exclusive pre- 
rogative of the Executive in this regard. It is contended by some 
that the President of the United States has the power to recognize 
the belligerency or the independence of a foreign nation. Second, 
that the power is exclusive, plenary, and determinative. Third, 
that his power can not be overruled by a treaty between the United 
States and any foreign nation, or by any act of Congress, or by 
any order, resolution, or vote of Congress, even though such act, 
order, resolution, or vote be passed over the President's veto by a 
two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress. 

THE CORRECT VIEW. 

It is contended upon the other hand that, while the President 
has power to recognize the belligerency or independence of a for- 
eign nation whenever he must deal, as the Executive, with the fact 
that it exists in a state of belligerency or independence, this power 
is not exclusive, plenary, and determinative, so that Congress may 
not deal with the same matter of fact in the form of a law. 

2783 



6 

It is contended also that the power of the Executive is subordi- 
nate to the treaty-making power of the United States, located by 
the Constitution in the President and the Senate, which may also 
deal with the fact as it exists. It is contended, too, that the Ex- 
ecutive power is subordinate also to the legislative power of the 
United States, located by the Constitution exclusively in the Con- 
gress and exercisable as prescribed therein with or without the 
approval of the President. 

And. finally, that recognition may be made by Congress, by order, 
resolution, or vote, as well as by the passage of a bill. To put the 
matter in other words, it is contended, and I contend: First, that 
the President may recognize the independence or belligerency of 
a foreign nation, and his right to do so when it arises is an Execu- 
tive right which is exclusive to him in the sense that he alone may 
exercise Executive functions; second, that the treaty-making 
power may make the like recognition, in which case that power 
is exclusively in the President and the Senate: and third, that the 
lawmaking power may also make such recognition, either indi- 
rectly by the exercise of some implied power arising out of its stated 
powers, or directly, since by acting directly it only accomplishes 
in a shorthand method of legislation that which it has the legiti- 
mate power to accomplish by a measure in detail. But when Con- 
gress acts, its action is, of course, subject to the Executive veto 
and subject also to that veto being overridden by itself. 

WHAT BELLIGERENCY MEANS. 

Let us now first define the terms we have to deal with. Bellig- 
erency is a word of Latin origin. It comes frombellum, war, and 
gerere, to carry on. A belligerent is a person carrying on war. 
Belligerency is the state or the condition of a person carrying on 
war. Nations do not deal with persons in other nations who are 
carrying on or participating in mere riots, fights, mobs, which are 
private wars. They do to a degree deal with all persons who are 
carrying on public war, and in an international sense belligerency 
is the state of those persons who are carrying on public war. 

War is that state in which a nation prosecutes its right by force. 
So says the Supreme Court of the United States in the Prize 
Cases in 2 Black, 666, and that case is fruitful in apt expressions 
which define and describe belligerent conditions and rights. 

Judge Grier, in that case, says: "The parties belligerent in a 
public war are independent nations," but he immediately quali- 
fies this expression by observing, ' ' but it is not necessary to con- 
stitute war that both parties should be acknowledged as independ- 
ent nations or sovereign states. A war may exist where one of 
the belligerents claims sovereign rights against the other." 

It is undoubtedly appropriate for Congress, in taking notice of 
the condition of affairs in Cuba, to move with caution and with 
due respect to every condition and suggestion; and to recognize 
a state of war existing in a foreign community without recogni- 
tion of the independence of the party, people, community, or dis- 
trict which is conducting that war against an older state is the 
most moderate and fitting form of action, until at least the insur- 
gents have shown themselves competent to maintain independ- 
ence. 

BELLIGERENCY AND INDEPENDENCE ARE MATTERS OF FACT. 

The independence or the dependence of a nation is simply a mat- 
ter of fact. The belligerency or peaceful condition of a nation is 
also a matter of fact. Anyone may in a mental sense recognize 

2783 



any fact. This, indeed, can not be prevented. Anyone may, so 
far as his personal conduct is concerned, govern himself accord- 
ing to the fact, unless prohibited by some paramount law which 
controls his conduct. If the fact of which he takes mere mental 
cognizance becomes in itself a paramount force, overriding the 
sanctions of law, the individual has the right to recognize that 
paramount force and govern himself accordingly, no matter what 
may be the interdict of municipal law. 

Out of this principle arises all the learning about governments 
de facto; that is, governments which exist as facts and which may 
be recognized by those whom they control, or whom they deal with, 
as facts, whatever they may be in legal abstract contemplation. 
A government de facto is the government of paramount force. 
This is the language of Judge Clifford in Ford vs. Surget, 97 
United States Reports, 617. 

WHAT RECOGNITION MEANS. 

Recognition is the mere act of recognizing. It is a mental act 
primarily, a perception of the mind. It is consciousness that a 
given object is identical with an object previously cognized or 
known or previously existent as an ideal of the mind. Knowing 
what a state of war is, the mind cognizes this abstract condition, 
and to recognize a particular state of war means to identify actual 
conditions as constituting what in the abstract is a state of war. 

From this original meaning the term has passed into a secondary 
meaning: that is, to signify a formal avowal or acknowledgment 
of the object or condition which is cognized. In an international 
or political sense the word " recognition " is used to express forma 
acknowledgment of one government by another as an independent 
sovereignty or as a belligerent nation. The opposite of the word 
"recognize," as we are told by the lexicographers, is to "disown," 
or some kindred word, as the opposite of " acknowledgment" is 
to deny or to conceal. 

IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT. 

It is important when there is a change in the condition of a 
nation so fundamental as that of peace to war and important 
when a new independent nation appears in the family of nations, 
that the facts be intelligently dealt with as soon as possible. 
Such facts can not be regarded with indifference by any nation.. 
Sometimes the one or the other of them creates so great an emer- 
gency that it must be dealt with instantly, and in most cases- 
commerce and the vast ramifications of business dependent upon 
it are so greatly affected that a conjunction arises of the most 
profound public concern. 

THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION IS A CONSTITUTIONAL, QUESTION. 

The executive power in a nation, always continuous, always on 
the alert, and always apprised of current events by its foreign 
ministers and ambassadors, consuls, agents, and correspondents,, 
is in the nature of things the most ready and available agent of 
national action, and in it in Great Britain and other monarchical 
nations is generally reposed the sole authority to make the appro- 
priate recognitions. But in the United States, Mr. President, 
this is a constitutional question, and it is one in which we might 
be gravely misled if we were to seek its interpretation by refer- 
ence to the practice of the British Government, from which so 
many of our legal and constitutional principles are derived. 

2783 



DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
MONARCH OF GREAT BRITAIN. 

The British executive is a hereditary monarch. The powers of 
the monarch are neither conferred nor limited by a written con- 
stitution. They are the growth of the ancient and immemorial 
customs of the realm, and some of them yet smack of the times 
when kingship and absolutism were almost synonymous terms, 
the good old times when "the king could do no wrong." 

The differences between our Executive and the King of Great 
Britain were well pointed out by Alexander Hamilton in the Fed- 
eralist, where he observed: 

" Our President is elected for four years," and is to be eligible as often as the 
people of the United States think him worthy of their confidence. A King of 
Great Britain " is an hereditary monarch, possessing the crown as a patri- 
mony descendible to his heirs forever." 
The President of the United States- 
He continues — 
would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and 
would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary 
course of law. The person of the King of Great Britain is sacred and invio- 
lable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is amenable, no punish- 
ment to which he can be subjected without involving the crisis of a national 
dissolution. 

In brief, Mr. President, taking the sense of Hamilton's essay, 
and contemplating the fact as we all know it to exist, the Presi- 
dent of the United States, instead of being an executive with the 
possession of prerogatives handed down from generation to gen- 
eration and consecrated by custom, is himself a mere creature of 
law and under the law, and has his great office for the most part 
in simply seeing to it that the laws are faithfully executed. Mr. 
Hamilton continues: 

The President of the United States is to have power to return a bill which 
shall have passed the two branches of the legislature for reconsideration, and 
the bill so returned is not to become a law unless upon that reconsideration 
it be approved by two-thirds of both Houses. 

The King of Great Britain, on his part, has an absolute negative upon the 
acts of the two Houses of Parliament. 

So, Mr. President, the President of the United States, being the 
creature of the Constitution and under the laws made in pursuance 
thereof, has no such veto power as exists in the monarch of Great 
Britain, who may destroy and kill a measure, whether it be a bill, 
a joint resolution, or any other form of parliamentary action, but 
can only act in an advisory relation to Congress with regard to it, 
disapproving it by his veto, indeed, but leaving it subject to be 
passed over his head by the sedate action of that body and by the 
necessary vote. 

As to the President's part in treaties and the difference between 
his part in making a treaty and the part played by the English 
monarch, Mr. Hamilton says: 

The President is to have power, with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. The 
King of Great Britain is the sole and absolute representative of the nation in 
all foreign transactions. He can, of his own accord, make treaties of peace, 
commerce, alliance, and of every other description. 

BRITISH PRECEDENTS INAPPLICABLE HERE. 

It has seemed to me, Mr. President, that those gentlemen who 
bave contended that the President alone can exercise the power of 
recognition when there is a state of war in a foreign nation or 

2783 



9 

when a new state has made itself independent have reached their 
conclusions from, the analogies of the English constitution and 
not from a sufficient reflection upon our own. The monarch of 
Great Britain is possessed of prerogatives which our Constitution 
has not conferred on our Executive. The monarch of Great Britain 
is the sole treaty-making power of the realm. 

The monarch of Great Britain may destroy a bill utterly and 
completely by his absolute veto power. The monarch of Great 
Britain may recognize the independence or belligerency of a for- 
eign nation by royal prerogative, which has existed for ages; and 
to attempt so to construe our Constitution, which was made in 
order to differentiate our President from the English executive, 
and to pattern on the model of British precedents, is to commit, 
as I conceive, a gross and fundamental error. 

Mr. CAFFERY. Will I interrupt the Senator if I ask him a 
question? 

Mr. DANIEL. Not at all. 

Mr. CAFFERY. It is the constitutional power of the President 
to accept and receive ambassadors, and does not that power give 
him a constitutional right to recognize belligerency or to recog- 
nize a de facto government by implication? 

Mr. DANIEL. I will speak to that point presently, for I intend 
to advert to it fully; and I will then give my learned friend from 
Louisiana the views of Madison and Hamilton upon that subject, 
which have much greater weight than any which I could myself 
suggest. 

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 

In the light of these introductory views, Mr. President, we look 
to the Constitution of the United States to see in whom is lodged 
the authority to recognize the independence or belligerency of a 
foreign nation. We find the powers of government therein clearly 
delineated as follows: 

Article I, section 1, puts the legislative power of this Govern- 
ment foremost, and evidently discloses the fact that it is in the 
legislative branch of this Government that the great mass of 
powers is confided. It says: 

All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States, which shal] consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. 

Article II says: 

The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America. 

Article III says: 

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such infe- 
rior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. 

EXCLUSIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT. 

Without going through a prolix recitation of the detailed pro- 
visions of the Constitution, I turn to see what are the exclusive 
powers of the President according to its letter and spirit. 

Undoubtedly the article declaring that executive power shall be 
vested in the President of the United States is an investiture of the 
President with sole executive functions. He has also power tinder 
that instrument to be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy 
of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when 
called into actual service of the United States, to require the 
opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the Executive 
Departments, to grant reprieves and pardons, to nominate ambas- 
sadors, other public ministers, and consuls, judges of the Supreme 
2783 



10 

Court, etc., to fill all vacancies that may happen during the recess 
of the Senate by granting commissions, to give to Congress infor- 
mation of the state of the nation, on extraordinary occasions to 
convene both Houses, in case of disagreement of the two Houses 
with respect to the time of adjournment he may adjourn them 
to such time as he shall think proper, to receive ambassadors and 
other public ministers, to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed, and to commission all the officers of the United States. 

These are certainly the principal executive powers conferred 
upon the President of the United States, and we must look to them 
to see whether they confer upon him any power to recognize the 
belligerency or independence of a foreign nation. 

Looking over the Constitution, we ask ourselves the question, In 
which clause is the President, or the President and the Senate, or 
the Congress, given the power to recognize such belligerency or 
independence, and is such power exclusive in the department to 
which it is given in the sense that no other department can exer- 
cise it? 

THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF IS UNDER THE REGULATIONS OF CONGRESS. 

Are we to say that the President has power to recognize bellig- 
erency or independence because he is exclusively vested with the 
power as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy? I do not 
think that such a power can be deduced from that office, certainly 
not in any sense which would deprive Congress of the power to 
limit the exercise of that office. The military function in the 
Constitution is added to the President's civil function to enable 
him to move and order troops, but the war-declaring function is 
solely in Congress. 

And, furthermore, the Congress has power expressly " to make 
rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval 
forces," and the President, in being made a part of them as their 
chief, conies immediately himself under " the rules and regula- 
tions " made by law for their government. Instead of the Presi- 
dent being " sacred and inviolable " and surrounded by " that 
divinity which doth hedge about a king," he is made by the Con- 
stitution subject to the military rules and regulations which 
Congress itself may establish. 

If he should invoke his military character to recognize a foreign 
nation as belligerent or independent (and it ma} T become neces- 
sary for him in certain exigencies to invoke that character and to 
exercise it), we must remember that he invokes also the superior 
power of Congress, under whose rules and regulations he may be 
controlled in the exercise of that power. 

Mr. Hamilton says on this subject, in the Federalist: 

The President is to be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same 
with that of the King of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to him. 
It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction 
of the military and naval forces as first general and admiral of the confed- 
eracy, while that of the British King extends to the declaring of war and to 
the raising and regulating.of fleets and armies, all of which, by the Constitu- 
tion under consideration, would appertain to the Legislature. 

There have been cases in which the President of the United 
States has had attributed to him certain powers to act with re- 
gard to the recognition of war as incident to his duties as Com- 
mander : in-Chief; but when he acts as Commander-in-Chief it 
must be remembered that he acts under the superior power of 
2783 



11 

Congress to regulate his action, and in no wise steps beyond the 
circle of legislative authority to make the laws which shall be his 
guide. 

THE EXECUTIVE POWER TO NOMINATE AMBASSADORS. 

Is it under the power to nominate ambassadors that there is 
attributed to the Executive the exclusive power to recognize bel- 
ligerency or independence? Certainly he could not recognize the 
belligerency of a foreign nation under the power of nominating 
ambassadors, because belligerency does not involve the question 
of sending an ambassador. Certainly he can not derive exclusive 
power to recognize independence from the right to nominate am- 
bassadors, for if he desired to send an ambassador to a new for- 
eign state he would be dependent upon the Senate to appoint him, 
and with the nomination would end the question of exclusive 
power. 

But suppose that the President should regard a nation as inde- 
pendent and the Senate did not regard it as independent. Suppose 
he nominated an ambassador and the Senate refused to confirm 
him. The Executive power would thus be exhausted in the nomi- 
nation. It would be snapped off and curtailed. Who could decide 
between the Senate and the President in the case of such a collision 
of views? Who, Mr. President, but the lawmaking power of this 
country, which is above both? 

THE POWER OF THE EXECUTIVE TO RECEIVE AMBASSADORS. 

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Virginia 
allow me to interrupt him? 

Mr. DANIEL. Certainly. 

Mr. DAVIS. Suppose the President of the United States should 
receive an ambassador. 

Mr. DANIEL. I am coming to that point now. Will we be 
told that the exclusive Executive power of recognition of inde- 
pendence or belligerency of a foreign state is deducible by neces- 
sary implication on the Executive authority "to receive ambas- 
sadors and other public ministers? " This is too slight a function 
for the attribution of so great a power to it, certainly in any ex- 
clusive sense. It is a mere ceremonial of state, belonging to the 
superficial, social relations of nations and to the etiquette of 
courts, rather than to the structure and genius of states and 
nations. 

To receive an ambassador is to identify and greet him. It is not 
necessarily or naturally the power of ultimate decision whether 
or not there is a nation which may send an ambassador. The 
President may nominate an officer. Congress alone can create the 
office. The President may command armies and navies. Con- 
gress alone can raise, support, and maintain armies and navies, 
and regulate the conduct of those who compose them. The Presi- 
dent may receive ambassadors, but Congress is the ultimate power 
that must say whether there is a nation competent to send them. 

VIEWS OF HAMILTON, MADISON, AND RAWLE. 

I will read in this connection what Hamilton said in the Feder- 
alist when he was discussing this subject, prior to the adoption of 
the Constitution: 

The President — 

He says — 
is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors and other public ministers. 
This, though it has been a rich theme of declamation, is more a matter of 
2783 



12 

dignity than of authority. It is a circumstance which will be without 
authority in the administration of the Government, and it was far more 
convenient that it should be arranged in this manner than that there should 
be a necessity of convening the legislature, or one of its branches, upon every 
arrival of a foreign minister, though it were merely to take the place of a 
departed predecessor. 

Mr. Hamilton in later days modified his views upon this subject, 
and fell into such a vein of argument upon it as we are sometimes 
treated to in the Senate. In No. 3 of the letters of Helvidius will 
be found some comments of Mr. Madison upon the question which, 
it seems, are worthy of consideration: 
Little- 
Says he — 

if anything more was intended by the clause than to provide for a par- 
ticular mode of communication, almost grown into a right among modern 
nations, by pointing out the department of the Government most proper for 
the ceremony of admitting public ministers, of examining their credentials, 
and of authenticating their title to the privileges annexed to their character 
by the law of nations. This being the apparent design of the Constitution, it 
would be highly improper to magnify the function into an important preroga- 
tive, even where no rights of other departments could be affected by it. 

Again he says: 

Had it been foretold in the year 1788, when this work [The Federalist] was 
published, that before the end of the year 1793 a writer, assuming the merit of 
being a friend of the Constitution, would appear and gravely maintain that 
this function, which was to be without consequence in the administration of 
the Government, might have the consequence of deciding on the validity of 
revolutions in favor of liberty, "of putting the United States in a condition 
to become an associate in war"— nay, " of laying the Legislature under an 
obligation of declaring war"— what would have been thought and said of so 
visionary a prophet? 

So Mr. Hamilton, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, 
as Madison, after it was adopted, never regarded this constitu- 
tional provision as carrying that force and effect which has been 
attributed to it by Senators, and certainly neither of them, nor 
any of our earlier statesmen within my knowledge, deduced the 
conclusion that the President had an exclusive right to control 
our foreign relations with respect to belligerency and independ- 
ence through a mere ceremonial clause of the Constitution defin- 
ing who should be the person to receive ambassadors who were 
sent to us. 

I will in this connection cite the comment of an early writer upon 
the Constitution. Rawle, in his work on the Constitution, on 
page 195, vises this language: 

The power of receiving foreign ambassadors carries with it, among other 
things, the right of judging, in the case of a revolution in a foreign country, 
whether the new rulers ought to be recognized. The Legislature, indeed, 
possesses a superior power, and may declare its dissent from the Executive 
recognition or refusal, but until that sense is declared, the act of the Execu- 
tive is binding. 

Mr. Rawle has stated the matter, as it seems to me, with nice 
legal discrimination, and that is what I take to be the law. I be- 
lieve that the President in dealing with our foreign or domestic 
relations has the rightful power to realize and to recognize any 
fact which intervenes or affects his administration of the law, but 
it is from his vested authority to see to it that the laws are faith- 
fully executed, and as he derives the power which he exercises to 
recognize belligerency or independence from the fact that he is 
the executor of the law, the very statement of his power implies 
the limitation that the law may regulate him in it or override him 
in it according to its constitutional will and pleasure. 
2783 



THE PRESIDENT'S DUTY TO INFORM AND RECOMMEND TO CONGRESS. 

Is the exclusive power which is attributed to the President trace- 
able in any degree to the President's authority in the Constitution 
to give to Congress information as to the state of the Union, and 
to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall 
judge necessary and expedient? I can not think so. On the con- 
trary, that clause indicates the subordinate relation of the Presi- 
dent to Congress in the treatment of facts which he has to deal 
with. 

The state of the Union involves our foreign as well as our do- 
mestic relations, debt, taxes, imposts, excises, favorite nations, 
belligerent nations, foreign and State commerce, postal communi- 
tions, science and art and their encouragement, courts, armies, 
navies, peace, and war — all that great diversity and complexity of 
affairs, world-wide and domestic, which are committed by the 
Constitution to the care of the lawmaking power. The Presi- 
dent may give information touching any and every of those topics; 
he may relate facts as he perceives and interprets them; he may 
make recommendations touching them; but his information may 
be mistaken, for he is not infallible as to his view of any fact of 
which he treats; his recommendation may be rejected. He is not 
a dictator. 

Suppose he is mistaken either in recognizing or in not recogniz- 
ing the belligerency or the independence of another nation, is 
Congress forever tied and bound down by his mistaken percep- 
tion or conception of a fact? No one can pretend that it is by any 
other fact, and that is to say that no one pretends to it, except as 
to those facts concerning which the Constitution has made the 
President's determination ipso facto conclusive. 

If he says such and such a nation is independent, are we to be told 
that Congress must so accept it, although it may involve a change 
of status in all the subjects upon which Congress has power to 
legislate? If he says a nation is belligerent or not, is that to end 
it conclusively and forever? And, according to the recent doc- 
trine that we have had urged upon us here by the State Depart- 
ment of the late Administration and by some Senators upon this 
floor, such action on the part of the President winds the whole 
matter up. 

Neither the President nor the Senate by a treaty made after- 
wards, neither the Congress, with the approval of the President, 
nor by a law passed over his disapproval, no power on earth, accord- 
ing to their arguments, can alter or change or modify a statement 
of fact which one man has avowed to be true; that is to say, that 
a certain state is to be treated as dependent or independent, bellig- 
erent or peaceful; his ipse dixit has settled it for the daj r upon 
which he said it and for all time afterwards until some other Presi- 
dent may come along and unsay it. 

Mr. CAFFERY. Mr. President 

Mr. DANIEL. One moment, if the Senator pleases. 

This is the one-man power in the most preposterous and attenu- 
ated shape that has ever appeared in this Republic. This is the 
one-man power modeled upon, the power of an ancient British 
king acting by custom and without constitutional limitation. 

Now I will hear the Senator's question. 

Mr. CAFFERY. I desire to know of my distinguished friend, 
first, whether or not he claims that the authority on the part of the 

2783 



14 

President and Congress is concurrent in the matter of recognizing 
belligerency or independence; and if so, whether the exercise by 
either of those branches of the Government of this authority pri- 
marily does not conclude Congress having concurrent jurisdiction, 
or, in other words, whichever of the concurrent powers first exer- 
cises jurisdiction over this subject-matter, does not exhaust juris- 
diction and fix the status either of belligerency or independence? 

Mr. DANIEL. My learned friend has asked me two questions. 
I must separate them before I undertake to answer them. 

In the first place, the Senator asks me if I maintain that the 
power of the President and Congress is concurrent. I would not 
use that word ' ' concurrent " in describing the power as I conceive 
it to exist. I think the President of the United States has certain 
implied powers through the exercise of which, for the purpose of 
executing the law, he may recognize the fact that he has to deal 
with; but as that power is derived— and I hope presently to show 
it — in the main (if not in all cases, in nearly all cases) from his 
constitutional authority to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed, that implies that when the law changes he must change 
with it; and the law is, in my judgment, the supreme power in the 
United States on that subject — above the Executive and above 
the treaty -making power. The President can only ' ' inform " Con- 
gress as to facts, and recommend as to laws. He is a witness as 
to facts, and an adviser as to laws. But in making laws to apply 
to facts Congress has sole and exclusive power; is, therefore, sole 
and exclusive judge in a legislative sense: and the Presidential veto, 
subject to be overridden by Congress, is the only way in which he 
has the prerogative of participation in Congressional action. 

Now, for the purpose of argument, before I finish answering the 
Senator's question, suppose the President and the Senate were to 
make a treaty upon certain subjects and find a certain condition of 
fact setting forth that certain nations were belligerent and certain 
others independent. The Senator would not contend that Con- 
gress might not come along and by a law set aside that treaty, for 
it is well settled that treaties may be set aside by law. 

So if you can set aside a treaty made by both the President and 
the Senate, why may you not override a conclusion which the 
President himself has reached as to a fact which you propose to 
treat differently? Or, if the President's action is binding, it is 
only binding until the superior power has overruled it, and then 
it ceases to be binding. 

I will meet the Senator's question, however, with an analysis of 
the President's power in several cases made by a quotation of 
judicial authority. 

IN WHAT CASES THE PRESIDENT MAY RECOGNIZE FACTS BEFORE HIM. 

I will say here, Mr. President, that I think that the President 
has the power impliedly in the exercise of his Executive function 
(1) to recognize the independence of a foreign nation; (3) also 
the belligerency of one foreign nation with another foreign nation; 

(3) also the belligerency of a foreign nation against this nation; 

(4) also the belligerency of any portion of this nation against 
itself; (5) also any local insurrection against Federal laws; (6) also 
to recognize any invasion of a State; (7) also, on application of a 
State legislature or a State executive when the legislature can not 
be convened, a case of domestic violence which calls for Federal 
interference. 

2783 



15 



THE GREAT EXECUTIVE POWER TO TAKE CARE THAT THE LAWS BE FAITH- 
FULLY EXECUTED. 

But I contend that these cases of Presidential recognition are 
all traceable to the President's duty under the Constitution to take 
care that the laws are faithfully executed. 

It may be when he is acting as Commander-in-Chief of the Army 
and Navy that a case may arise of an emergent nature in which 
that officer alone has opportunity and occasion to recognize the 
condition of war that he must deal with ; but whether we trace 
his authority to the fact that he is Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army or Navy, or that he is simply acting as an Executive to take 
care that the laws are faithfully executed, it is the law always that 
is the fountain of authority under which he acts. 

When an executive act is to be done, it does not follow that the 
same fact may not be a subject-matter of executive action on the 
part of the President and of a lawmaking act on the part of Con- 
gress; and when it is made the subject of a lawmaking act on 
the part of Congress, that act is the supreme law of this land to 
the President and to everyone in it, unless by holding up that 
law in comparison with the Constitution you can see that Con- 
gress has exceeded its power. 

Mr. C AFFERY. Mr. President, my friend has been very indul- 
gent, and I hope he will let me ask one more question. J have 
been very much struck with his exposition of his views upon this 
subject. I would inquire of him by what process of reasoning he 
deduces the power on behalf of Cosgress to recognize a matter of 
fact from the grant of legislative functions? In other words, 
whether a recognition of belligerency or a recognition of ade facto 
government by Congress comes within the purview by natural 
implication of the power generally to legislate; and if so, by what 
process of reasoning does he reach that conclusion? 

Mr. DANIEL. The Senator from Louisiana has asked me two 
or three questions. Would he simply put only one now? What 
is the Senator's first question? 

Mr. CAFFERY. My question is, Does the Senator deduce the 
power of the President to recognize the existence of a new gov- 
ernment from a constitutional grant to receive ambassadors and 
ministers? 

Mr. DANIEL. Not from that alone; but others have so con- 
strued his power. 

Mr. CAFFERY. Well, from others. 

Mr. DANIEL. Will my friend allow me to ask him how can the 
President of the United States derive power to recognize the bel- 
ligerency of a foreign nation like the Cuban Republic, which sends 
no ambassador here, from his right to receive an ambassador, if it 
did send one? 

Mr. CAFFERY. I do not myself derive the power of the Pres- 
ident to recognize belligerency from his power to receive ambas- 
sadors. 

Mr. DANIEL. From what source doss the Senator deduce it? 

Mr. CAFFERY. I deduce the power of the President to recog- 
nize the belligerency of a people warring against another. 

Mr. DANIEL. From what power in the Constitution? 

Mr. CAFFERY. From the general power in the Constitution 
that places the President in charge of our external relations. 

Mr. DANIEL. What clause in the Constitution? I should like 
to have the Senator point it out. 

2783 



16 

Mr. CAFFERY. From the clause in the Constitution which 
authorizes him to send ambassadors to foreign countries. 

Mr. DANIEL. I would ask the Senator to point out the par- 
ticular phrase he relies on. 

Mr. CAFFERY. To receive ambassadors, I mean. 

Mr. DANIEL. Suppose a country does not send ambassadors? 

Mr. CAFFERY. Then it is not a country, and nobody can 
war against it. There is no belligerency and no independence in 
question in such a case. 

Mr. BACON. If the Senator from Virginia will permit me, I 
should like to say to the Senator from Louisiana that the Presi- 
dent can not send an ambassador except by the consent of the 
Senate. He has no such power. 

Mr. CAFFERY. Very well. When he sends his ambassador, 
with the consent of the Senate, to Spain or to England, that places 
him in possession of our external affairs with those countries. 
All matters of fact, all intelligence necessary to be known bearing 
upon the conditions in those countries comes within the purview 
of the President of the United States; and as belligerency is a fact, 
and as the President of the United States is the only branch of the 
Government having charge of the fact and the power to collect 
the facts, I deduce that the President of the United States is the 
proper power, and the only power, to pass upon a matter of fact 
involving belligerency. That is my deduction, whatever it may 
be worth. 

Mr. SPOONER. Mr. President 

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. President, I will come to the point sug- 
gested in the question of the Senator from Louisiana in a few 
minutes, and then I will yield for a question to the Senator from 
Wisconsin. 

Mr. CAFFERY. If my friend from Virginia will permit me a 
little further, I deduce the power to recognize the independence 
of a nation from the power to receive an ambassador or minister 
from that nation. I contend that when the President of the United 
States has accepted a minister, has received an ambassador, that 
his finding in the premises is conclusive. 

Now, if my friend will pardon me a moment longer — I do not 
want to make a speech, and I shall be very short— Ire asked the 
question in a part of his discourse, as to whether or not when the 
President had found a certain state of facts existing which war- 
ranted him in recognizing an independent government, another 
branch of the Government could not overturn his finding. I 
think clearly not, and that whatever may be the jurisdiction of 
the President, whether it be exclusive or whether it be concurrent, 
his passing upoa the matter primarily is conclusive. 

Mr. SPOONER. Will the Senator allow me to ask him a 
question? 

Mr. DANIEL. I will yield to a question, but it breaks the 
thread of my discourse to have other gentlemen make speeches in 
the body of mine. I should have great pleasure in hearing them, 
if they were not speaking when I have the floor. 

Mr." SPOONER. I have no desire to make a speech. 

Mr. DANIEL. I know that, and will yield to the Senator's 
question with pleasure. 

Mr. SPOONER. I have listened attentively to the arguments 
of the Senator. I understand the Senator to concede the power 
of the President to recognize the belligerency or independence of 
*783 



17 

a nation, as the case may be. President Cleveland might, there- 
fore, have recognized, had he chosen so to do, the belligerency of 
the Cuban insurrectionists or the independence of Cuba. Whence 
comes, in the Senator's opinion, the authority of the President to 
do that? Would it be pursuant to any act of Congress, or would 
he derive his power from the Constitution alone? 

Mr. DANIEL. Mr. President, in answer to the Senator's ques- 
tion, I will read him first a passage from the second volume of 
Story on the Constitution, and I will make this passage my answer 
in some degree to the questions of the Senator from Louisiana 
[Mr. Caffery] and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Spooner] . 

In 1793 President Washington issued a proclamation forbidding 
the citizens of the United States to take any part in the hostili- 
ties then existing between Great Britain and France, warning 
them against carrying goods contraband of war and enjoining 
upon them an entire abstinence from all acts inconsistent with 
the duties of neutrality. He was assailed for this act, as our peo- 
ple sympathized with France, but it is well observed by Judge 
Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution with reference to 
President Washington's action, as follows: 

If the President is bound to see to the execution of the laws and treaties 
of the United States, and if the duties of neutrality, when the nation has not 
assumed a belligerent attitude, are by the law of nations obligatory upon it, 
it seems difficult to perceive any solid objection to a proclamation stating 
the facts and admonishing the citizens of their own duties and responsi- 
bilities. 

There is the touchstone principle, " the execution of the laws 
and treaties of the United States; " that is the great source of 
Presidential authority. 

I admit that that is not a complete answer to the Senator from 
Wisconsin [Mr. Spooner] , because the belligerents in that case 
were established nations, but I make it a halfway house on my 
way to answer; and there is a clear, logical pathway to the con- 
clusion that the President may recognize the belligerency of a new 
nation, since it is the belligerency that makes the occasion for the 
exercise of neutrality as provided for in our laws. I think, and 
the general public sense of this country concurs, that President 
Washington had the right — and such were the construction and 
view taken by the courts — to realize the fact that there was a war 
going on between Great Britain and France, and the greatest of 
our commentators on the Constitution, among the text writers 
who have written about it, predicates that power upon the great 
executive right to see to it that the laws are faithfully executed. 

It is not difficult to deduce the power in that respect. Now, 
where the President may get the incidental and implied power to 
recognize the independence of a foreign nation that sends ambas- 
sadors here, or to whom he sends ambassadors, is also not difficult 
to arrive at. 

There it is deducible from the Constitution as an incidental 
power. But the Senator asks me the question, Where, in the Con- 
stitution, does the President get the right to recognize the bellig- 
erency of a new people contending against an old-established gov- 
ernment? 

I could not get it at all unless it may be derived from the Ex- 
ecutive authority to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed, 
and from the incidental power, inherent in our very nature, for 
any man who is charged with the execution of laws to use his five 
2783—2 



18 

senses to perceive the conditions under which they are being ex- 
ecuted or attempted to be executed. I get it in the same way that 
I would that the commander at Governors Island would get power 
if a foreign fleet were to steam up New York Harbor to-morrow 
and were to open its guns upon Governors Island. 

I do not think that any officer or noncommissioned officer or any 
private soldier of the United States would hesitate to train the 
guns of Governors Island upon the foreigner invading our country 
until he had waited to hear from Washington and had got an order 
from the Commander-in-Chief. So a policeman may arrest men 
for assault and battery when he sees them fighting, but that does not 
conclude their rights before courts nor conclude the legislature 
from making such laws as it sees fit regulating arrests for assault 
and battery and regulating the whole subject-matter. The Presi- 
dent gets authority to recognize a fact from the constitutional fact 
that he is charged with the execution of the laws in this country 
and. from the exercise of his five senses. Facts can not be fenced 
off from the recognition of anyone who has the duty devolved 
upon him to deal with them. 

Mr. HOAR. Will the Senator allow me to put in one word? 

Mr. DANIEL. Let me finish my sentence, and then I shall be 
very glad to do so. 

The President gets his authority from the exercise of his five 
senses in contemplating the condition under which the laws are 
to be executed. 

Mr. HOAR. I was about to 

Mr. DANIEL. No; one more moment; then I will yield. I 
remember 

Mr. HOAR, It was merely with reference to the sentence the 
Senator was on. 

Mr. DANIEL. Just one more moment. 

Mr. HOAR. Certainly. 

Mr. DANIEL. I wish to complete my sentence. 

Mr. HOAR. Certainly. 

Mr. DANIEL. I hope the Senator will permit me to finish my 
thought. 

Mr. HOAR. Certainly; I beg pardon. 

Mr. DANIEL. I once had a friend who had been a cadet at 
WestPoint. Soonafterhe got to West Pointthe commandant sent 
officers around to ask the cadets of the guard what they would do 
under this circumstance or that, and they went to one and said, 
"What would you do if you were to see that the barracks were on 
fire? " He said, ' ' I would call the officer of the guard. " One cadet 
gave one answer, another cadet another answer. They came to 
this boy and asked, "What would you do?" He said, "I would 
halloo fire as loud as I could, and try to put it out as soon as I 
could get to it." 

Any soldier, no matter what may be the situation, and any ex- 
ecutive officer who is charged with the administration of a trust, 
has the right to realize and recognize a fact which confronts him 
in the exercise of that duty; but he may misperceive it as well as 
perceive it, and, in my opinion, the fact is not ultimately settled 
until dealt with by iiltimate jurisdiction. 

The power to declare war rests solely in Congress; but that did 
not prevent President Polk from sending American troops into 
Mexico when war, without being declared by this country, had 
been made upon it and Mexican troops had invaded our soil. 
2783 



19 

There is an inherent right in an intelligent being to exercise his 
five senses, and it is not denied to exist in any political body 
which represents sovereignty, except in the Congress of the 
United States, which we are told can not recognize a state of war, 
however flagrant, however patent, and however much it may 
affect our foreign and domestic relations. 

Now, I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts. 

Mr. HOAR. I think I ought to rise now only to apologize to 
the Senator. He was making such a beautiful statement of what 
I generally accord in that I wished simply 

Mr, DANIEL. I could make no statement that could not be 
bettered by a statement from the Senator from Massachusetts. 

Mr. HOAR. I wish to ask the Senator if his point is not in sub- 
stance that the power to recognize the fact 

Mr. DANIEL. Because it is a fact 

Mr. HOAR. Arises from the duty of acting upon the fact. That 
is all. 

Mr. DANIEL. I think that is a very sententious and a very 
conclusive statement about it. 

Mr. HOAR. I should like to ask the Senator a question, how- 
ever, in regard to his criticism of the power of Congress. I do 
not wish to interrupt the thread of the Senator's discourse, but 
perhaps, now that he has been interrupted by another question, he 
may prefer to yield rather than before he resumes his argument. 

Suppose on the 3d day of March, 1897, the two Houses of Con- 
gress, or either of them — I will say both of them — recognized Cuba 
as an independent and a belligerent and adjourned until next De- 
cember, and thereafter, within ten days, the Cuban armies were 
overthrown in battle, surrendered, and all Cuba were at peace, 
and she, as far as she is a being, admitted the authority of Spain, 
is the President bound by that recognition to treat Cuba as an 
independent and as a belligerent until the first Monday in Decem- 
ber, or so long thereafter as it takes Congress to come together 
and act? 

Mr. DANIEL. I think not, for then the basis of action disap- 
peared. 

Mr. HOAR. Then is it not true that the question of belliger- 
ency is a question constantly changing from day to day and from 
week to week? 

Mr. DANIEL. Undoubtedly. 

Mr. HOAR. And that no power under the Constitution can 
bind the Executive power, which has the duty of acting upon the 
fact as it exists, because that duty of acting upon the fact as it 
exists must change with the changing facts? 

Mr. DANIEL. I agree with the Senator. 

Mr. HOAR. The Executive is here all the time. He is all the 
time our agent for communicating with foreign governments. 
He is not in session half of each year or a little over, like Con- 
gress, and from the necessity of the case must it not be that that 
power, except so far as it is incident to some act of Congress 
which is necessary, must be vested in him? 

PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS IN PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS OF FACTS. 

Mr. DANIEL. The power is vested in any executive officer to 
recognize a fact with which he is charged by law with the respon- 
sibility of dealing. It is a natural power, and it is one that we 
can not eliminate from mundane affairs and human nature. The 

2783 



20 

world is full of facts. He that hath eyes to see, let him see. He 
that hath ears to hear, let him hear. 

When Congress receives a statement of fact from the President, 
it is presumed to be true in every physical, moral, and legal 
aspect. This is but a common-law doctrine — all things official 
are presumed to be solemnly and rightly done. No one would 
imagine that the President would make false statement of a fact 
in a physical or moral sense, but he is liable to make a mistake as 
to the reality in a physical sense and in a legal sense also. If he 
says there is no public war in Cuba in a iegal international sense, 
we may presume it to be true. 

If he says the Cuban Republic is not independent in a legal and 
international sense, we presume it is true. In ninety -nine cases 
out of one hundred no dispute is ever raised as to a presidential 
statement of fact or assumption of fact. When he continuously 
recognizes Great Britain as an independent nation, there is no dis- 
pute about it; the matter ends. When he says there is a French 
Republic and recognizes it, the matter ends, there being no dispute 
about the existence of the fact. 

When President Harrison said there was a Hawaiian Republic, 
there was no dispute about it, and it so ended. When, during 
this very winter, the Major Republic of Central America appeared, 
the President received its minister. There was no dispute about 
it. The Major Republic was recognized by everybody according 
to the fact which, without controversy, existed at the time he 
communicated and acted upon it. 

Eut now suppose we traverse the view of the President that 
there is no public war in Cuba, if such be his view, and he has not 
yet said either that there is or is not. Suppose we traverse his alle- 
gation as to the Cuban Republic. Have we not the right to do it? 
Are we forever estopped by his mistaken view, if he takes a mis- 
taken view? Are we bound by the supposititious fact as he saw it 
with his eyes? In short, is a possible Presidential mistake as to a 
fact which he communicates to Congress forever beyond remedy 
by the treaty-making power and by the lawmaking power? 

NO EXCLUSIVE POWER IN THE PRESIDENT TO DETERMINE FOREIGN OR 
DOMESTIC PACTS. 

In my judgment, the American people have a right to determine 
by their Senators and Representatives in Congress assembled the 
question of fact as it may concern any law which they have the 
power to pass, or any resolution which they have the power to pass, 
and I think that the menace from the State Department to Congress 
which was made some months ago, and its defiant attitude toward 
the lawmaking power of the Republic, can never affect the dispo- 
sition of any independent, high-minded Senator or Representa- 
tive to decide this question for himself under his oath of office. 

I deny that the Constitution has anywhere hinted at the exclu- 
sive power of the President of the United States to determine any 
fact with relation to our domestic or foreign concerns, while I 
do not deny he may determine it for himself in so far as the exe- 
cution of the laws may require him to do it as an Executive matter. 

FACTS DETERMINABLE BY THE TREATY-MAKING AND THE LAWMAKING 

POWER. 

Mr. President, I have tried to reason upon this subject without 
resort to precedents, or with very little allusion to them. In my 
judgment, the judicial precedents in this country are in favor of 

2783 



21 

my proposition; the necessary logic of the case seems to me to 
render it irrefutable. I will put a case. Suppose that the Presi- 
dent of the United States were to-day to declare that the Cuban 
Republic is an independent republic; and suppose a new Presi- 
dentof the United States to-morrow were to negotiate a treaty with 
Spain by which the United States made itself the ally ot Spain and 
which recited that the United States would not recognize or would 
not treat the Cuban Republic as an independent nation, and were 
to declare war upon it, and prohibit commerce with it. Is there 
any man in the Senate bold enough to declare that the treaty- 
making power of the United States, confided by the Constitution 
of the United States in the President and the Senate, could not by 
that treaty override, wipe out, destroy, and render absolutely null 
and void any Presidential recognition which had previously oc- 
curred? So, if the treaty-making power may thus override posi- 
tive action upon the part of the President of the United States, 
why may not the lawmaking power, which is superior to the 
treaty-making power, go along and override and destroy and wipe 
out both? 

What the Senator from Massachusetts has suggested it seems 
to me is correct. A fact must be respected because it is a fact in 
the sense and in the conscience of the person who contemplates the 
fact, and the recognition of it is only binding during the period 
that its recognition is extant and efficient. Vesuvius, by its lava, 
might destroy Italy to-morrow: or, suppose it were a fact that it 
did. The independence of Italy, being an attribute, would go out 
with the destruction of the country, and a recognition of Italy to- 
day would not make an obligation upon us to recognize it to-morrow 
unless the fact remained there for the recognition to apply to. 

Now, let me present a brief examination of some of the judicial 
precedents. 

Mr. HOAR. Before the Senator passes to that point, if he is at 
the end of this subject, I should like to ask him one other question 
in regard to what he has just said, if it would not be disagreeable 
to him. The Senator made a very interesting suggestion, in which 
I entirely agree with him, which was that when, as he thinks, 
Mexico invaded this country, Mr. Polk was not bound to wait for 
an act of Congress, but it was his duty to repel the invasion as 
President of the United States, charged with the execution of the 
law. 

The Senator will remember very well that a good many of the 
Whig party, including John Quincy Adams and a good many 
Northern Representatives, thought Mr. Polk was all wrong in his 
fact and voted against the resolution in the House of Congress that 
war existed by the act of Mexico. 

Now, suppose that party had been strong enough to carry both 
Houses of Congress by a two-thirds vote and to pass an act declar- 
ing that war did not exist by the act of Mexico, that she was not 
invading us, and ordering the President not to repel the invasion. 
Would it have been any the less Mr. Polk's duty to do exactly what 
he did, to protect the country? 

Mr. DANIEL. As I understand it, suppose Congress had not 
recognized a state of war, and had declared 

Mr. HOAR. To the contrary. 

Mr. DANIEL. I think a condition of that sort would be so 
near anarchy that the President might seriously consider whether 
he had not better take the law in his own hands and defend the 
2783 



22 

country, whether Congress said so or not. It would be a case of 
Congressional revolution well-nigh impossible. I think that is a 
condition of anarchy. 

Mr. HOAR. Will the Senator permit me to go a little further 
into the historical facts in connection with my question to make 
it clear? The Senator said, and it seems to me he is absolutely 
right, that it was within the constitutional power and was the 
constitutional duty of President Polk, Mexico, in his judgment, 
being a belligerent against us at that time, to repel them. Mr. 
Clay said at the same time, or just after, that he would sooner 
have laid down his life than to have subscribed to the resolution 
of the House of Representatives approving Mr. Polk's course and 
declaring that war existed by the act of Mexico. 

Now, suppose Mr. Clay had had two-thirds vote of his followers, 
and that Congress had said war does not exist by the act of Mexico, 
she is not a belligerent against us, and we prohibit the President 
from repelling her invasion. The question I put is, Would not 
Mr. Polk have had exactly the same power under the Constitution, 
and would it not have been his duty to execute it, Congress or no 
Congress? I think it would. 

Mr. DANIEL. The Senator is putting a very extreme and, I 
might say, a preposterous case. 

Mr. HOAR. Mr. Clay did not think so. 

Mr. DANIEL. Oh, well; political speeches made by gentlemen 
who are candidates for the Presidency very often overstate the 
facts, are very often exaggerations, and irradiate the landscape 
with colors we never see in real life. 

I can not conceive of a case in which a Congress of the United 
States, loyal to the country, would state a fact contrary to the 
manner in which it existed, and declare that there was peace with 
a nation which had its armed men upon our soil. It would be a 
case of anarchy. Such extreme suggestions confuse rather than 
elucidate interpretations, and I might well say as to them, ''Suffi- 
cient unto the day is the evil thereof." 

But so far as the Constitution is concerned, so far as the Con- 
stitution gives to Congress alone the power to declare war and 
gives it authority to prescribe rules and regulations for the gov- 
ernment of its armies, in a constitutional sense, and reading the 
instrument according to its intent and meaning, I can never con- 
ceive that the President of the United States could override a law 
of Congress and make war upon another nation when the power 
in the country which has the sole power of declaring war refuses 
to declare it or to tolerate it. 

The reason why Mr. Polk was justified in marching his army 
into Mexico and attacking the Mexicans was because he was con- 
fronted with a fact, and that fact was the invasion of his own 
country. It was not a declaration of war by the United States 
against Mexico, but an exercise of the inherent and natural right 
of self-defense— to execute the laws by repelling those who trod 
upon them — to shoot back at a man who commences first to shoot 
at you. These questions of constitutional law are very simple. 
There is no trouble about their elucidation and solution by the 
most simple rules of common reason and common sense. 

THE JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS. 

I wish to say upon this subject as to a possible conflict of au- 
thority between Congress and the President, that so far as the 
judicial precedents have developed there is no precedent distinctly 
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23 

in point; none in which there has ever been a collision of author- 
ity between the lawmaking and the executive power. It is to be 
observed, also, that there is no specific power in the Constitution, 
shaped in so many words, authorizing anybody in this country to 
recognize the independence or the belligerency of a foreign state 
or nation. In whomsoever that power may exist (and that it does 
exist none can dispute) , it is a power implied from their being 
invested with the right to exercise some other power to which it 
becomes the essential incident. 

That being the case, I do not question that there may be cases 
in which the President may recognize the independence of a for- 
eign nation, because he may receive ambassadors, because he may 
appoint ambassadors, nor the belligerency of a foreign nation, be- 
cause a condition of war, which is the belligerency of a foreign 
nation, devolves upon the President the duty and right to see that 
our laws of neutrality between those who are belligerent are ob- 
served, as President Washington did in 1793 between two estab- 
lished nations which were belligerents. 

It matters not what may be the age of the nation ; it matters 
not what may be the legal status of the nation. When a nation 
becomes belligerent, we have laws which apply to it as a belliger- 
ent, and having laws which apply to it, which the President is 
charged to see are executed, he is vested by law as well as by the 
Constitution with the power to recognize and realize the condi- 
tions to which he must apply the law. 

Furthermore, I observe that no case has yet arisen in which it 
was necessary to determine whether the power exercised by the 
President was exclusively vested in him. It being vested in him 
in certain conditions and by certain implications, it has never 
been challenged in the sense that any conflicting power of Con- 
gress has been arrayed against him, and as a rule he has always 
been guided by the fact, and in recognizing the fact has simply 
pursued the dictates of his own intelligence in executing the law. 

No case has arisen in which the President has exercised the 
power of recognition in which he has not been sustained by the 
courts. 

The courts look to the political, as contradistinguished from the 
judicial, department to take cognizance of the political changes 
which take place in the revolutions and vicissitudes of nations, as, 
for instance, in the case of the Nueva Anna, Wheaton, 193 (1821), 
where the Supreme Court refused to recognize the existence of 
any lawful court of Mexico at G-alveztown, which had assumed, 
under authority of the Mexican Republic, to condemn the cargoes 
of two Spanish ships, basing its action on the fact that the Gov- 
ernment of the United States had not hitherto recognized "the 
existence of any Mexican republic or state at war with Spain." 

In The United. States vs. Palmer, in 3 Wheaton, 648, I find lan- 
guage of the Supreme Court which meets with my most hearty 
approbation as containing the law of this subject: 

This court is further of opinion that when a civil war rages in a foreign 
nation, one part of which separates itself from the old-established govern- 
ment and erects itself into a distinct government, the courts of the Union 
must view such newly constituted government as it is viewed by the legis- 

iative and executive departments of the Government of the United States. 
1 the Government of the Union remains neutral, but recognizes the exist- 
ence of a civil war. the courts of the Union can not consider as criminal those 
acts of hostility which war authorizes, and which the new government may 
direct against the enemy. 
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24 

"The legislative and executive departments of the United 
States." That is the language of the court. 

Now I read again from a more recent decision of the United 
States Supreme Court, Jones against The United States, 137 United 
States Eeports, page 212 (1890), in which Judge Gray gave the 
unanimous opinion of that tribunal: 

Who is the sovereign de jure or de facto of a territory is not a judicial 
but a political question, the determination of which by the legislative and 
executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges as 
well as all other officers, citizens, and subjects of that government. This 
principle has always been upheld by this court and has been approved under 
a great variety of circumstances. 

So in a still more recent decision in the case of the Three Friends 
by, the Supreme Court of the United States they speak of the 
" political department of the Government " as contradistinguished 
from the judicial, and not of the executive as contradistin- 
guished from the legislative as the department which has proper 
and suitable jurisdiction of the subject-matter. 

A LEADING CASE, SHOWING THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT IS DERIVED 
PROM HIS DUTY TO EXECUTE THE LAWS. 

I will read from a leading case on this subject, in which I think 
it will appear clearly that according to the decision of the Supreme 
Court made in that particular case, and in concurrence with the 
views which I have just presented from two other cases, it is the 
view of that court that the executive power to recognize the in- 
dependence or the belligerency of a foreign nation is a power de- 
rived from executive duty to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed. 

From the fact that in either nominating an anlbassador or in 
receiving an ambassador the President of the United States must 
impliedly pass upon the question in some cases whether or not 
another nation is belligerent or independent, it does not follow 
that under that particular power he may get the authority to pass 
upon that question in all cases. But there is no conceivable case 
that I can imagine in which a foreign government has assumed a 
belligerent attitude toward another, or in which a new govern- 
ment has made itself belligerent, that it does not come within the 
purview of the Presidential power, in the exercise of its duty to 
take care that the laws are faithfully executed, to make the proper 
recognitions which are necessary in order to execute the laws 
faithfully. 

In the Prize Cases, reported in 2 Black, this whole subject was 
thoroughly reviewed by Judge Grier in a very able and instructive 
opinion of the United States Supreme Court. That was a case in 
which the President of the United States had declared a blockade 
against certain ports in the South. The paragraph which I shall 
read appears to my mind to contain a true indication of the source 
of executive power: 
By the Constitution- 
Says the Supreme Court — • 

Congress alone has the power to declare a national or foreign war. It can 
not declare war against a State, or any number of States, by virtue of any 
clause in the Constitution. The Constitution confers on the President the 
whole executive power. 

Now, what is that? 

He is bound to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He is Com- 
mander in -Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the mili- 
tia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United 

2783 



25 

States. He has no power to initiate or declare a war either against a foreign 
nation or a domestic State. But by the acts of Congress of February 38, 1795, 
and 3d of March, 1807, he is authorized to call out the militia and use the mili- 
tary and naval forces of the United States in case of invasion by foreign na- 
tions and to suppress insurrection against the government of a State or of 
the United States. 

Mr. President, there is no recognition and there is no war made 
by the Executive of the United States that niay not be traceable 
to the Constitution and the statutes made as thus pointed out by 
the Supreme Court of the United States to enable the Executive 
to faithfully execute the laws. When President Polk sent the 
armies of the United States to meet those of Mexico, he acted 
under an act of Congress by which he had the right to repel 
invasion. 

As Commander in Chief of our forces, if at any time an enemy 
to the United States were to appear in his presence or to assail us 
in any direction, the laws are plenary and ample to enable the 
President to recognize whatever condition of things presents 
itself, and to deal with it in a defensive way or in an offensive- 
defensive way, as the facts of the time and the occasion might 
suggest to his conscience and comprehension. 

Mr. President, in all these cases it is recognized by the courts 
that have given their opinion (though I have no doubt that some 
obiter dictum of a judge may be found here and there from 
which a different inference might be drawn) that it is the great 
character of the President as Commander in Chief of our Army 
and Navy and as the Chief Executive to see to it that our civil laws 
are administered, from which he may derive all his rights to real- 
ize and to recognize the conditions which are presented to him 
when he proceeds to carry out his constitutional prerogative and 
his legal authority. 

The very statement of his power implies the fact that he is 
under the laws of this country; that he is a creature, both as 
Commander in Chief of the regulations which Congress may pass 
for the guidance of his conduct, as well as for the guidance of the 
conduct of any other soldier in the Army of the United States; 
that as President, while he may exercise those functions which 
are purely executive without dictation from Congress, in the great 
mass of those duties they themselves consist in seeing to it that 
the laws are faithfully executed; that by the very terms of the 
statement of the power employed, the lawmaking power is above 
the executor of the law, and that he is the agent, the executive 
agent, of the people, simply to carry out and to do in our domes- 
tic relations and in our foreign relations those things which the 
lawmaking agent of the people has prescribed for him to do. 

THERE IS NOTORIOUS PUBLIC WAR IN CUBA. 

Mr. President, there has been a condition of public war in the 
Island of Cuba for two and a half years. The diplomacy of the 
Spanish Government has succeeded in blinding the eyes of the 
diplomatists of the United States to the realization of that fact. 
They have disowned and repressed and concealed under diplo- 
matic expressions the fact instead of recognizing it. But the 
world knows the fact that there is war in Cuba, high-handed, red- 
handed, bloody, lamentable, cruel, savage war — war which has 
resounded all over the universe; that has filled our prints with its 
hideous scenes, and touched our hearts with its piteous cries. 

We know it, Mr. President. There is war in which Spain has 
employed to put down the Cuban insurrection a larger army than 
2783 



26 

any government of the Old World ever sent against an American 
revolution — a larger army than the great British Government 
itself ever sent to put down the insurrection of the colonies of 
1776, and it has been opposed by armies upon the other side. 

It may be that the tactics of the forces of the Cuban Republic 
armies have been such tactics as G-eorge Washington advised 
Braddock to follow when he assailed the Indians in the wilder- 
ness, not to march in solid divisions, where they could be mowed 
down by the artillery and the train bands of Spain, but to attack 
the enemy where and when they could, with such weapons as 
they had the opportunity to employ, and shaping their tactics and 
strategy according to the country and the population, the sources 
of supply, and the exigencies of the hour. 

The late President of the United States told us in his message 
last December that " the insurrection in Cuba still continues with 
all its perplexities," and that "if Spain still holds Habana and 
the seaports and all the considerable towns, the insurgents still 
roam at will over at least two-thirds of the inland country." 

Innumerable Spanish victories on paper are always being her- 
alded, and peace is constantly being proclaimed from the house- 
tops of the Captain- General and the dens of Morro Castle; but the 
insurgents still roam around over the island, while nearly a fourth 
of the 200,000 troops of Spain have perished, and anarchy is rip- 
ping tip and burning everything amidst scenes of devastation, 
desolation, murder, arson, poverty, disease, and starvation. They 
are making deserts and calling them peace; making proclamations 
and calling them peace; making war and calling it peace. We 
are just now sending bread and clothes to the hungry and naked 
fugitives of our own blood who are being corralled in cities, and 
hying hither and thither to find shelter from the peace that nestles 
under the Spanish torch, and the Cuban sword. But we all know 
here that this is war; the American people know that this is war; 
Europe and the world know that this is war — public war; as pub- 
lic as Cuban and Spanish armies can make it; as public as tele- 
graph and printing press can make it; as public as any other 
patent, notorious, and irrepressible fact. 

Mr. President, when Congress undertakes to recognize that fact 
about which we have abundance of Presidential messages depict- 
ing all the deplorable incidents of this long and bloody struggle, 
we are met here in the Senate of the United States with the state- 
ment that Congress must not recognize what everybody knows, 
must not demean itself in the spirit of neighborship and humanity 
toward a struggling people who are at our doors, because it may be 
conceived to be inimical to Spain. I should not be restrained by 
that consideration from recognizing the fact as it appears to me, 
but this argument is a misconception of law. It is not inimical 
to Spain. 

We have a right in all good friendship to Spain. If Spanish 
friendship is so precious a thing as to be preferred to the rights of 
human nature, it is no breach of friendship with Spain for us to 
recognize with respect to one of her colonies what she realizes and 
what all Europe realizes, and what the United States through its 
President and generals realized when we had civil war in this 
country, that when the guns were thundering they could hear 
their thunder, that when the soldiers were marching and fighting 
they could see them marching and fighting. It is not only our 
right, it is our duty, as intelligent and conscientious men, to ap- 

2783 



prehend, comprehend, realize, and conduct ourselves according to 
the fact of which our senses, certainly our senses of hearing and 
sound, take notice. 

HUMANITY PROMPTS THIS RESOLUTION. 

If I am actuated or moved to urge this action upon the Senate 
because in my own breast I sympathize with an oppressed people, 
it is no motive for which I owe anyone an apology. It is an hon- 
est and noble sympathy. It is a fact that there is war in Cuba, 
whether we record it in our resolution or not; it is a fact that 
there is public war in Cuba, whether we sympathize with Cuba 
or with Spain; and it being the fact, it is an act of humanity for 
us to deal with it according to the fact, and to throw the moral 
weight of this great Government toward seeing to it that that 
war is conducted with as close an approximation to Christian 
usages and to civilized customs as may be practicable under the 
circumstances. 

WHERE INTEREST LIES. 

I know that in some respects it may be detrimental to some in- 
terests here or there to recognize the belligerency of the Cubans. 
To recognize their belligerency on the part of the United States is 
to change our attitude legally and commercially in certain re- 
spects. But on the whole, I believe that this nation will derive 
advantage from recognizing the belligerency of the Cubans. All 
laws and treaties which are now in force with Spain will still 
remain in force. 

It may subject some of our vessels to the right of search and to 
certain annoyances, but for the sake of doing justice and acting 
rightly these annoyances ought not to be weighed in the balance. 
It will give to the Spanish Government the right to blockade the 
Cuban ports, if she pleases so to do, but she would already have 
done that if she were prepared to do it and if it were their inter- 
est to do it, and if she should do it hereafter she will suffer more 
than we. 

In the next place, it does relax to some extent the responsibility 
of Spain on account of atrocities committed or damages inflicted 
on our citizens in chat island. I would about as soon hold the 
Cuban Republic responsible for what is clone by their troops or by 
their agencies as to hold Spain. It is a swap from one to the 
other, in which there is little choice from a pecuniary standpoint. 
It can not be a very disastrous one, and even if we did lose some- 
thing for our own citizens in the matter of recovering damages, 
for the cause of human justice, of human liberty, and for the dig- 
nified and honorable course of the United States I for one would 
be well willing to pay the price. Justice and liberty and honor 
are cheap at any price.. 

THIS RESOLUTION DOES NOT MEAN WAR. 

Mr. President, it is said that this means war. I deny it. If 
Spain should declare war against us, if she should seek to foment 
war against us, because we recognize the belligerency of her for- 
mer subjects who have been fighting her two and a half years, she 
will have an unjust cause of complaint and war against us, and we 
will have a just cause of complaint and war against her. I do 
not wish to see the American people involved in war. I look upon 
war as one of the greatest calamities that can befall the human 
race. 

2783 



28 

But there is one other much greater calamity, and that is for 
the high public spirit of a great nation to be so* deadened that it 
can look upon plunder and pillage and murder and arson with 
indifference, and can stifle truth for venal considerations. It is 
worse than war for the public spirit of that nation to be so dead- 
ened that it hesitates or delays one instant to go forward and do 
any act of high and great justice because of fear of war. 

If Spain were a greater and more powerful nation, if she had 
tenfold the power she has, the dignity of the case would inspire 
the Government of the United States to act more quickly and 
without such prurient sentimentality and tenderness as tha.t pro- 
fessed for an old nation which clings with beak and talons to the 
last American possession yet within her grasp. 

OUR PECULIAR RELATIONS TO CUBA— WE GAVE THEM THEIR EXEMPLAR. 

A few words more, Mr. President, and I am done. This is not 
the ordinary case of the belligerency of one segment of an ancient 
empire or state against the old and established government. Geo- 
graphically speaking, Cuba is a part of the American continent. 
It is right by us, and all the writers of international law realize 
and write down their views that humanity in such a case is a just 
ground for intervention. If this were an intervention, we could 
multiply the texts of international writers and publicists, includ- 
ing the late President of the United States, to show that it is good 
ground for the interference of this great nation. 

But there is a higher ground, Mr. President, on which it is due 
from the United States that we should act with a high spirit of 
justice and consideration toward the struggling Cubans. If they 
are trying to throw off the yoke of an old government which has 
been oppressive to them, which has burdened them with taxes 
which they can but poorly bear, which has denied to them the 
representation which, as we maintain, is the right of freemen, let 
me remind the people of the United States here and now that, 
however they may preach upon this subject, they were themselves 
the great nation that set the Cubau patriots this example. 

Our fathers did just that thing a hundred years ago which they 
are doing. It is we who have promulgated the principles, it is we 
who have preached the doctrines, it is we who have done the 
things that Cuba points to to-day and conjures her brave men to 
imitate and follow. 

WE HAVE WARNED OTHER NATIONS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH CUBA. 

But more than that, Mr. President, we have assumed from the 
very foundation of this Republic, as we were so aptly reminded 
by the Senator from Nevada [Mr. Stewart] to-day,' a peculiar 
relation to the Cuban isle. We have said to Great Britain, we 
have said to France, we have said to Germany, we have said to 
all the nations of this earth, " Cuba is in natural affinity with the 
American Republic. It is a fortress that is hard by our sea gates. 
We will not allow you to go there and rescue these suffering peo- 
ple. We will not permit you to extend over that island a stable, 
wholesome, established government. We will not allow you to 
intrench yourselves there. We will not allow you to meddle 
with this subject at all. Stand off, stand off, and attend to Euro- 
pean policies. We are the great western nation. We are the 
young, rich, and powerful heir of time, and we are to dictate, and 
to guide-, and to rule, and to control, and to shape the destinies of 
the great American continent." 
2783 



29 

Having taken that attitude, which was to our advantage, hav- 
ing taken that attitude for the purpose of working out our own 
development and defending our own liberties, are we going to say 
that we will not bear the burden of that attitude, and are we going 
to back down from it the very first time it presents to us an incon- 
venience or a troublesome complication? 

When a great nation goes forward and announces a great gen- 
eral principle, when it enunciates its destiny and its intentions to 
the nations of the earth, it can no more recede with honor from 
that proposition made than a soldier can abandon a flag which he 
is instructed to plant upon a rampart. We will be looked upon by 
other nations, if we avoid that responsibility, as a nation that makes 
much bluster and brag, but that does not stand up to its essential, 
moral, legal, and international obligations. 

Realizing that to be an obligation, one of equity, one of frater- 
nity, one of neighborship, and one which points its prophetic finger 
to the future career of the American continent, I would not hav« 
this country act hastily about it; I would not have it act incau- 
tiously about it; but in clear vision and by sure-footed steps, by 
graded paces from which we should never recede, I would go for- 
ward and let the people in Cuba know that we expect them to be 
accorded by Spain belligerent rights; that their prisoners are to 
be treated as prisoners of war and not shot down as dogs; and 
that Christian civilization, through the voice of the American 
Republic, gives to them, and demands for them, all the respect 
and consideration which go with the right of war. -^_ 

Let us recognize the belligerency of the Cuban people, which is a 
fact; and in sending to our own people in Cuba bread, as we have 
done, as an act of charity, let us act toward those who are engaged 
in this awful strife with an equal spirit of justice. [Applause iv 
the galleries.] 

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Wellington in the chair). 
Order must be preserved in the galleries. 
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